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THE INADEQUACY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
VOIR DIRE

I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Constitution provides Americans with the right
to a fair and impartial trial by a jury of their peers.' The Sixth Amendment guarantees that criminal defendants will receive verdicts from indifferent and impartial jurors.2 The Seventh Amendment serves as the
counterpart of the Sixth Amendment, granting civil parties the same
rights and guarantees. 3 Although the United States Constitution guarantees these fundamental rights, criminal and civil parties in Massachusetts
are not receiving the rights because the jury selection process is ineffective at obtaining juror candor.4
To ensure that criminal defendants and civil parties receive a fair
trial by an impartial and unbiased jury, each state has instituted the voir
dire mechanism. 5 The term "voir dire" literally means "to speak the

'See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, VII (noting fundamental right guaranteed by US
Constitution).
2See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (specifying criminal defendants rights to jury trial);
see also Susan E. Jones, Judge-Versus Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical
Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 No.2 LAw AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 131 (1987) (noting
US Constitution's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee criminal defendant right
to fair trial).
3
See U.S. CONsT. amend. VII. The Seventh Amendment of the United States
Constitution provides:
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Id.
, See infra notes 66 -71, 80-89 and accompanying text (reasoning in support of
alternative approach).
' See Jones, supra note 2, at 132 (noting goal of voir dire to obtain impartial and
fair jury); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1996) (defining voir dire
procedure).
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truth" or "to see them talk.",6 More appropriately, however, voir dire is
defined as the "preliminary stage of jury selection during which jurors
are examined to determine their suitability to hear the case before the
court."7 The ability to effectively obtain juror candor during the voir dire
may differ depending on each state's method." The Massachusetts legislature has recently proposed to change the voir dire system in certain
counties. 9 This new legislation would allow lawyers in civil and criminal
cases to question jurors for thirty minutes.' 0 Allowing attorneys to question jurors would result in more candid answers and would begin to resemble the more effective Connecticut voir dire system.'
This note examines the different processes that Massachusetts and
Connecticut employ when conducting their voir dire, and advocates for
Massachusetts' adoption of Connecticut's system. Part II traces the history of the Massachusetts voir dire system and its inherent problems.
Part HI examines the Connecticut voir dire system and explores its advantages over the Massachusetts system. Connecticut's system is more
effective in obtaining juror candor because the system allows attorneys to
individually question each juror out of the presence of the other jurors.
Part IV concludes with a recommendation that Massachusetts adopt
Connecticut's method of the voir dire as it is more effective in eliciting
juror candor.

6See

David Suggs and Bruce D. Sales, JurorSelf Disclosure in Voir Dire:A So-

cial Science Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 245, 245 (1981) (defining literal translation of term
voir dire); see also Jones, supra note 2, at 131 (noting literal translation).
See Jones, supra note 2, at 131 (defining term "voir dire").
'See infra notes 66-71, 80-89 and accompanying text (discussing advantages of
attorney conducted individual voir dire).
'See Martin F. Murphy, Individual Voir Dire in CriminalTrials: Where is the SJC
Headed?, 42 BOSTON BAR J. 8, 24 (1998) (citing Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly, April
7, 1997) (noting that Middlesex County, Bristol County and Worcester County may
allow attorneys to question jurors).
0
See Murphy, supra note 9, at 24 (outlining potential changes certain counties
may undergo).
" See infra notes 62-65, 76-78 and accompanying text (discussing Connecticut's
voir dire system).
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II. A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE MASSACHUSETTS
VOIR DIRE SYSTEM

Massachusetts has a very limited form of voir dire despite the
broad language expressed in the statute.1 2 The statute provides, in pertinent part:
[Ulpon motion of either party, the court shall, or the parties or their attorneys may under the direction of the
court, examine on oath a person who is called as a juror
therein, to learn whether he is related to either party or
has any interest in the case or has expressed or formed
and opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice
therein. If the court finds that the juror does not stand
in the case, another shall be called in his
indifferent
13
stead.

In Massachusetts, the judge customarily acts as the sole conductor of the
voir dire.14 The judge asks general questions prescribed by statute to the
12

See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1999) (noting Massachusetts

procedure for voir dire).
13 See id. (noting either judge, attorney, or parties themselves
may conduct voir
dire). The Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure require the judge to ask the same
questions that he is required to ask under Massachusetts General Laws ch. 234 § 28.
MASS. R. Civ. P. 47. The rule states, in pertinent part:
The trial judge shall examine on oath all persons called as jurors, in each
case, and shall ask: (1) whether any juror or any member of his family is
related to any party or attorney therein; (2) whether any has any interest
therein; (3) whether any has expressed any opinion on the case; (4)
whether any has formed any opinion thereon; (5) whether any is sensible
of any bias or prejudice therein; and (6) whether any knows of any reason
why he cannot or does not stand indifferent in the case. The jurors shall
respond to each question separately before the next is propounded. The
trial judge may submit of his own motion on that of any party, such additional questions as he deems proper. The trial judge may also, on motion
of any party, permit the parties or their attorneys to make such further inquiry of the jurors on oath as he deems proper.
Id.
14 See Commonwealth v. Burden, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 666, 671,448 N.E.2d 387,
392 (1983) (noting judge shall question jurors about bias and prejudice). In Burden, the
defendant was convicted of breaking and entering, armed assault in a dwelling, armed
robbery, aggravated rape, and second-degree murder. Id. at 667. The appeals court held
the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion to permit defense counsel to
conduct the voir dire. Id. at 666, 448 N.E.2d at 387. The appeals court again stated, that
"in this Commonwealth, the voir dire examination of prospective jurors is customarily
conducted by the judge." Id. at 671, 448 N.E.2d at 392. The Commonwealth does not
have to allow attorney conducted voir dire. Id. See also Commonwealth v. Pope, 392
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entire jury pool collectively in order to identify jurors who have formed
opinions about the case or have any bias or prejudice that will prevent
rendering a verdict based on the evidence presented during
them from
5
the trial.'
Historically, this method of group questioning is commonly used
in Massachusetts, although the statute does call for individual questioning.' 6 The statute provides:

Mass. 493, 504, 467 N.E.2d 1171, 117-125 (1984) (stating judge is sole conductor of
voir dire and attorneys have no right to question). In Pope, the defendant was convicted
of rape. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held "the judge acted within his discretion in refusing defense counsel's motion to conduct the voir dire and denial of the requested individual voir dire questions." Id. Additionally, the Pope court took up the
issue of when an individual voir dire is warranted. Id. The court stated that they already
decided that in rape cases involving black defendants and white victims a judge must
grant the defendant's request for an individual voir dire. Id. The judge will satisfy the
due process requirement for the individual voir dire as long as the judge asks questions
on the subject of racial prejudice in a "clear and understandable manner with follow-up
questions where needed." Id. at 505, 467 N.E.2d at 125. See Commonwealth v.
DiStatsio, 294 Mass. 273, 278, 1 N.E.2d 189, 193 (1936) (suggesting judge's duty consist of questioning potential jurors and determining if dismissal is required). In DiStasio,
the defendant was convicted of first degree murder and appealed on the basis of the
court's denial to allow his attorney to conduct the voir dire. Id. at 273, 1 N.E.2d at 189.
The court reiterated the often stated rule that the examination of prospective jurors is
under the court's discretion, whether conducted by counsel or by the judge as is customary. Id. at 280, 1 N.E.2d at 194. The DiSatasio court clearly acknowledged the discrepancy between the language used in the statute and the actual practice of the court. Id.
The court also emphasized that the questions asked rarely go beyond the statutorily required questions. Id.
"sSee Commonwealth v. Sheline, 391 Mass. 279, 290, 461 N.E.2d 1197, 1205
(1984) (holding judge ask jurors if interest in case, preconceived opinion, bias or prejudice); see also Commonwealth v. Jones, 9 Mass. App. Ct. 103, 114, 399 N.E.2d 1087,
1096 (1980), aff'd in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 382 Mass. 387, 416 N.E.2d
502 (holding collective questioning jurors to elicit bias or prejudice is not abuse by trial
court). In Jones, a jury convicted the defendant, a police officer, of three counts of involuntary manslaughter, three counts of vehicular homicide and operating to endanger
arising out of fatal automobile accident occurring while the defendant was off duty. Id.
at 103, 399 N.E.2d at 1087. The appeals court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by asking questions collectively to jury on the issue of preconceptions in the
absence of groundwork called for by statue in governing examination of jurors. Id.
According to the Jones court, there is no requirement under the first paragraph of M.G.L.
ch. 234, § 28, for a judge to individually question jurors about the topics listed in the first
paragraph of the statute. Id. at 114, 399 N.E.2d at 1096. The first paragraph of the statute "gives the trial judge broad discretion whether to refine or improve on the subjects of
the statute by going into more detail. Id.
'6 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1996) (noting circumstances
when individual voir dire should be conducted).
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[Wihen it appears that, as a result of the impact of considerations which may cause a decision to be made in
whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the case, including but not limited to, community attitudes, possible
exposure to potentially prejudicial material of possible
preconceived opinions toward the credibility of certain
classes of persons, the juror may not stand indifferent,
the court shall, or the parties or their attorneys may with
the permission and under the direction of the court examine the juror specifically with respect to such considerations, attitudes, exposure, opinions or any other matters which may, as aforesaid, cause a decision or decisions to be made in whole or in part upon issues extraneous to the facts of the case. Such examination may include a brief statement of the facts of the case, to the extent the facts are appropriate and relevant to the issue of
such examination, and shall be conducted individually
and outside the presence
17 of other persons about to be
called or already called.

Ordinarily, however, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) allows the trial
judge to determine when an individual voir dire is warranted. I8
See MASS. GEN. LAWS

ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1996) (warranting individual

voir dire in certain circumstances); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 8-9 (discussing
limited circumstances that require individual voir dire); Commonwealth v. Nickerson,
388 Mass. 246, 247, 446 N.E.2d 68, 70 (1983) (holding judge who questions juror's
indifference must ask specific questions about problem he perceived); Commonwealth v.
Hobbs, 385 Mass. 863, 871, 434 N.E.2d 633, 640 (1982) (listing extraneous factors that
judge should consider in determining juror's indifference). According to Hobbs, when it
appears that a prospective juror may not stand indifferent because of extraneous issues
such as racial prejudice, the judge must examine the jurors individually asking specific
questions about the problem perceived. Id. at 873, 434 N.E.2d at 641.
'aSee Hobbs, 385 Mass. at 871, 434 N.E.2d at 640 (holding judge will determine
when extraneous issue to case arises). In Hobbs, the court stated "the judge's determination on whether a problem of extraneous influence has arisen will be upheld unless he
has abused his discretion by refusing to examine jurors in the face of substantial risk of
bias." Id. at 873,434 N.E.2d at 641. See Commonwealth v. Shelley, 381 Mass. 340,
352, 409 N.E.2d 732, 740 (1980) (holding to warrant individual questioning, judge must
determine juror is not indifferent due to extraneous issues). According to the Shelley
court, the defendant may give the judge information showing the need for an individual
voir dire, but ultimately it is left up to the judge's determination. Id. at 352, 409 N.E.2d
at 740. Even if the defendant does not supply the judge with information, the judge may
be able to determine on his own based on the facts of the case whether or not he should
conduct an individual voir dire. id. As the statute mandates, if a potential juror answers
any of the general questions asked collectively to the jury pool in the affirmative that
juror is brought to the sidebar and asked a few additional questions. MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1996). When the potential juror is asked additional questions,
the trial judge is allowed to rely on the testimony of the potential juror in determining
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In 1981, the SJC changed its position on when an individual voir
dire is warranted.' 9 The court's initial change occurred in Commonwealth v. Sanders, a case involving a black defendant who was convicted of raping and stabbing a white woman. 2' The trial judge refused
defense counsel's request for an individual voir dire of prospective jurors
concerning their racial prejudices.22 On appeal, the SJC held that "there
are some circumstances when the allegations about the crime, alone require an individual voir dire., 23 The court set new precedent, declaring
that "as a matter of law interracial rape cases present a substantial risk
that extraneous issues will influence the jury [and therefore] prospective
jurors are to be interrogated individually in accordance with the statute
rather than as a group." 24
In 1982, the SJC further developed its position on the applicability of the individual voir dire when it extended the Sanders rule to other
types of cases, including interracial child sexual abuse and interracial

whether the juror is biased or prejudiced. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 389 Mass.
667, 675 n.7, 452 N.E.2d 202, 207 (1983) (holding judge may look to juror's testimony
in order to determine if bias exists). If the juror states that he will remain impartial despite his disposition it is up to the judge to determine whether or not the juror should be
removed for cause. See Ladetto v. Commonwealth, 356 Mass. 541, 545, 254 N.E.2d
415,417 (1969) (holding judge shall determine if juror can remain impartial). See also
Nickerson, 388 Mass. at 248 (citing rule stated above in Hobbes).
', See Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (documenting beginning of SJC's change in long
standing precedent).
20 383 Mass. 637, 421 N.E.2d 436 (1981).
21 See Commonwealth v. Sanders, 383 Mass. 637, 637, 421 N.E.2d at 436;
see also
Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing Sanders and its effect on voir dire).
2See Sanders, 383 Mass. at 638, 421 N.E.2d at 436 (noting trial judge's refusal to
conduct individual voir dire); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing trial court's
decision in Sanders to deny defendant's request).
' Sanders 383 Mass. at 638,421 N.E.2d at 436. See also Murphy, supra note 9, at
9 (discussing court's determination to move away from group questioning and insist on
individual questioning).
24
See Sanders, 383 Mass. at 640-41, 421 N.E.2d at 438 (citing new rule with regards to interracial rape cases); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing Sanders).
The determination of whether or not an individual voir dire is warranted is no longer left
up to the trial judge if the case involves interracial rape. Id. A trial judge must now
question jurors individually and outside the presence of other jurors regarding their racial
views. Id. The SJC acknowledged that the group questioning method was ineffective
when it came to interracial rape cases because such cases are a "catalyst of racial prejudice." Id. Interracial rape cases present one of the few instances in Massachusetts when
an individual voir dire is required. Id. at 9.
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2
murder cases.25 In Commonwealth v. Hobbs,26
prosecutors charged a
27
black man with sexually abusing a white child. The SJC acknowledged
that racial prejudices would arise due to the sensitive nature of the case.28
The court held that in future cases involving interracial sexual offenses
against children, an individual voir dire of all potential jurors on the issue of race is required.2 9
Similarly, the SJC in Commonwealth v. Young 3° acknowledged
the ineffectiveness of the group questioning method for eliciting juror
bias. 3' The Young court convicted a black defendant of murdering a Hispanic man. 32 The court held "that questions directed to the discovery of
racial prejudice be asked in certain circumstances in which such an inquiry is not constitutionally mandated."3 3 The court, therefore, extended
the principles of Sanders and Hobbs by requiring a trial judge to individually examine prospective jurors when the defendant is accused
of
34

murder and the defendant and victim are of different racial groups.

The SJC, however, has refused to mandate an individual voir dire
in a number of other types of cases.35 In Commonwealth v. Shelley,36 the
25See Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing SJC's acknowledgment of ineffectiveness of collective questioning in cases involving racial issues).
28

385 Mass. 863, 434 N.E.2d 633 (1982).

27

See id. at 873, 434 N.E.2d at 641 (noting different races of victim and defen-

dant); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing evolution of individual voir dire
with regards to interracial child sexual abuse).
28 See Hobbs, 385 Mass. at 873, 434 N.E.2d at 641 (discussing court's belief that
racial prejudice would arise in cases of interracial child sexual abuse).
29 See id. (holding individual voir dire necessary if case involved interracial child
sexual abuse)
30 401 Mass. 390, 517 N.E.2d 130 (1987).
31 Id. See also Murphy, supra note 8, at 9 (noting
Young was next step for mandated individual voir dire)
22
See Young, 401 Mass. at 390, 517 N.E.2d at 130 (noting defendant and victim
were of different races).

'" See id. at 398, 517 N.E.2d at 135 (noting extension of Sanders rule); see also
Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (documenting new rule with regards to interracial murder).
234
See Young, at 398, 517 N.E.2d at 135 (stating application of new rule occurs
when victim and defendant are of different races).
asSee Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (tracing history of extension of individualized
voir dire). Murphy does state that even though it appeared that the SJC was extending
the individual voir dire to a number of race related issues, the SJC was still leery of overextending the requirement of such a time consuming venture. Id. During the 1980's and
early 1990's, the SJC made sure that the mandated individual voir dire was applied in
only a limited number of cases. Id. See infra notes 36-39 and accompanying text (discussing specific cases in which SJC denied extension of individual voir dire).
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court wrote "it appears to us a doubtful proposition that questions (concerning juror bias about psychiatrists) need be asked in every case involving testimony by psychiatrists and the defense of insanity ...[t]he
present record contains nothing to make that proposition more
plausible."3 7 The SJC and the Appeals Court have also continuously
rejected defendants' requests for an individual voir dire in cases involving homosexuals charged with sex crimes, defendant's disseminating
obscene films, and cases where unpopular car dealers were accused of
38
larceny and claimed to dislike a number of potential jurors in the area.
381 Mass. 340, 409 N.E.2d 732 (1980).
37 See id. at 353, 409 N.E.2d at 740 (noting SJC's refusal to extend individual voir
dire to psychiatric testimony and insanity). In Shelley, the defendant was convicted of
first degree murder. Id. at 340, 409 N.E.2d at 732. The defendant alleged that his male
friend made homosexual advances toward him. Id. at 342, 409 N.E.2d at 734. The defendant used a meat cleaver and a fork to kill his male friend. Id. In conducting the voir
dire, the judge asked the potential jurors the questions required by statute and a group
question submitted by counsel. Id. at 352, 409 N.E.2d at 739. The Commonwealth's
questions related to the defendant's age, the fact that the crime involved several stab
wounds, and the victim's sexual preference. Id. The defendant's questions related to the
pretrial publicity and the juror's opinions about psychiatrists and their field of study. Id.
Three of the potential jurors were excused. Id. at 352, 409 N.E.2d at 739. At trial, the
defense presented three expert witnesses to assess the defendant's state of mind. Id. at
344, 409 N.E.2d at 735. One of the psychiatrists concluded that the defendant suffered
paranoid illusions focusing on homosexuality. Id. The defendant, on appeal, stated that
M.G.L ch. 234, § 28 required the trial judge to conduct an individual voir dire. Id. at
351,409 N.E.2d at 739. The defendant emphasized that jurors would not speak freely
about their views of homosexuality, nor about their biases concerning the field of psychiatry. Id. at 352-53, 409 N.E.2d at 740. The SIC held that the trial judge was not
required to conduct an individual voir dire because there was not a substantial risk that
jurors would be influenced by the extraneous issues emphasized by the defendant. Id. at
353, 409 N.E.2d at 740. The SIC reasoned that they were not even sure if psychiatrists
fell in the category of a "class" according to the statute and secondly stated that an individual voir dire is not required in every case where there is a shocking and gruesome
crime. Id. Finally, the court ruled that, as to the role of bias against homosexual behavior, there was no testimony at trial from any homosexual witness and, therefore, any
preconceived opinions about homosexuality would not have influenced the jury. Id. In a
footnote, however, the SJC did admit that collective questioning on sensitive issues may
not elicit a response from some jurors who would respond if asked the same question in
private. Id. at 353, n.12, 409 N.E.2d at 740, n.12. See also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9
(noting no extension of individual voir dire in psychiatric cases and insanity cases).
38 See Commonwealth v. Boyer, 400 Mass. 52, 56, 507 N.E.2d 1024, 1027 (1987)
(holding individual voir dire would not be extended to homosexual prejudice). In Boyer,
the defendant was convicted of three complaints of common night walking. Id. The
defendant requested the jurors be questioned individually on the following:
(1)The defendant in the case is a homosexual. Do you have feelings
about homosexuals that might make it difficult for you to be impartial in
deciding the case? (2) Do you believe homosexuality should be illegal?
(3) Are you a member of a religion that regards homosexuality as a sin?
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Similarly, the court has refused to extend the mandatory individual voir
dire to cases involving both interracial armed robbery and ethnography.39
In 1993, the SJC revisited its criticism of the group questioning
method. 40 In Commonwealth v. Flebotte,4 ' the court promulgated a new

If so, might your religious beliefs influence you in deciding the defendant's guilt or innocence? (4) Do you believe homosexuals are more likely
to engage in illegal sexual acts than other people?
Id. The court denied the defendant's request to mandate as a matter of law that individual voir dire is necessary in all cases involving homosexuality. Id. The court noted that
it already rejected the notion that the mere presence of issues related to homosexual
activity requires an individual voir dire of all potential jurors in Shelley. Id. at 56, 507
N.E.2d at 1026. The court found that there was no basis in the record to require the
judge to conduct a voir dire. Id. The court also noted that if it did set new precedent, it
would only apply to future cases and would not help this individual defendant. Id. See
also Commonwealth v. Duddie Ford, 409 Mass. 387, 390-392, 566 N.E.2d 1119, 1122
(1991) (holding individual voir dire not extended to car dealers convicted of larceny). In
Duddie Ford, the Commonwealth charged the defendant, car dealer, with larceny. Id. at
388, 566 N.E.2d at 1120. The defendant wanted the jury to be individually questioned as
to their opinions about car salesman and car dealers. Id. The Court refused the defendant's request. Id. See also Murphy, supra note 9, at 9 (stating SJC refused to extend
individual voir dire to certain types of cases).
s9 See Commonwealth v. Grice, 410 Mass. 586, 590, 574 N.E.2d 369, (1991)
(holding armed robbery was not type of crime requiring individual voir dire). In Grice,
the defendant argued that the principles of Sanders, Hobbs, and Young should be applied
to his case. Id. at 589, 574 N.E.2d at 369. See also supra notes 19-34 (discussing Sanders, Hobbs, and Young). In response the court noted that armed robbery was not the type
of issue that was so likely to inflame passion or invoke racial prejudice as to require a
judge, as a matter of law, to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors. Id. The
court further held that even though armed robbery is a serious offense and may result in
significant harm to the victim, there is nothing inherent in the crime that will inflame the
racial prejudice of jurors. Id. The court did note that there may be cases involving interracial armed robbery which require an individual voir dire, but the SJC decided to leave
that determination up to the trial judge's discretion. Id. See Commonwealth v. De La
Cruz, 405 Mass. 269, 269, 540 N.E.2d 168, 168 (1989) (denying Hispanic man charged
with rape of white girl individual voir dire). In De La Cruz, the Commonwealth convicted the defendant of indecent assault and battery of a child under 14. Id. at 270, 540
N.E.2d at 168. The defendant argued that the court should follow the Young ruling that
mandated an individual voir dire when the defendant and victim were of different race
and the defendant was convicted of murder. Id. at 273, 540 N.E.2d at 171. The court
denied the defendant's request ruling that "Young does not stand for the proposition that
a crime committed by a Hispanic defendant against a white victim is interracial." Id.
40
See Murphy, supra note 9, at 22 (noting SJC continued to extend individual voir
dire as matter of law).
" 417 Mass. 348, 630 N.E.2d 265 (1994).
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rule that jurors must be polled individually about their experience with
child sexual abuse. a2 The SJC reasoned that:
[A]s the present case well illustrates, adult victims of
childhood sexual offenses may be reluctant to come forward from a venire and discuss such a private and highly
emotional event with a judge; they may be embarrassed
about it, they may feel that it would not affect their objectivity, or they may just not want to discuss it. Individual voir dire of these individuals would further assist
43
the judge in uncovering signs of impaired objectivity.
The SJC continued extending the use of the individual voir dire
through by adding the insanity defense to the list of instances requiring
an individual voir.44 In Commonwealth v. Seguin,45 the Commonwealth
accused the defendant of murdering his wife, daughter and son.4 The
defendant asked the judge to conduct an individual voir dire of all prospective jurors about certain aspects of their backgrounds and their views
on the insanity defense. 47 The trial judge refused the defendant's extensive request but told the jury collectively that if they could not remain
impartial because of the defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of in-

42

See id. at 353, 630 N.E.2d at 268 (discussing extension of individual voir dire to

minor sexual abuse cases); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 22 (noting SJC extended
individual voir dire beyond race). In Flebotte, the trial judge refused defense counsel's
request to poll jurors individually concerning their views on child sexual abuse. Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 353-54, 630 N.E.2d at 268-69. The judge instead polled the jurors
collectively on the issue. Id. at 354, 630 N.E.2d at 269. During deliberations, one of the
jurors disclosed that someone had sexually violated him as a young child. Id. The trial
judge dismissed the biased juror and polled the remaining members to ensure impartiality. Id. During the individual questioning stage, the judge dismissed another juror because the juror could not remain impartial. Id. The SJC found that the trial judge acted
properly in refusing the defendant's individual voir dire request. Id. at 353, 630 N.E.2d
at 268.
, See Flebotte, 417 Mass. at 355-56, 630 N.E.2d at 269-70 (reasoning individual
voir dire necessary in child sexual abuse cases because of embarrassment); see also
Murphy, supra note 9, at 22 (documenting reason SJC extended individual voir dire to
child sexual abuse cases).
" See Murphy, supra note 9, at 22 (tracing extension of individual voir dire to insanity defense).
,5421 Mass. 243, 656 N.E. 2d 1229 (1995).
"See id. at 244, 656 N.E.2d at 1230.
" See id. at 244, 656 N.E.2d at 1231 (discussing defense counsel's attempt to obtain individual voir dire); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 22 (commenting on Seguin's
attempt to individually question each juror on view of insanity defense).
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sanity they should excuse themselves from the case.48 The judge later
questioned each juror individually, and discovered that ten of the jurors
who previously remained silent when asked collectively about their view
of the insanity defense actually opposed the use of the insanity defense. 49
The SJC ruled that the questioning at trial ensured the jurors were not
biased based on the defendant's insanity plea.50 The court ruled that in
future cases where the defendant's sanity is called into question, the trial
judge must question each of the jurors individually on their view of the
insanity defense. 5'
The SJC in Seguin offered various reasons for changing long
standing precedent. 52 First, based on the jurors' responses to the trial
judge's individual questioning, a majority of the population did not be-

48 See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 245, 656 N.E.2d
at 1231 (discussing trial judge's attempt to impanel jury free of bias and prejudice).
49 See id. (noting judge conducted individual voir dire as well as collective
voir
dire). The trial judge told prospective jurors the following:
[Tihe Commonwealth has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that this defendant was both guilty of the alleged crime and was
criminally responsible: that is, legally sane. If the Commonwealth fails in
its burden to prove he was legally sane, have you any opinions that would
prevent you from returning a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity?
Id. Some of the reasons the ten jurors gave for being opposed to the insanity defense
were: "(1) I would have a hard time being objective with an insanity plea." (2) "I just
think if there's a crime committed someone should pay for what they've committed. (3)
"I do not believe in that verdict." (4) " I have a problem with guilty or not guilty due to
reason of insanity." Id. at 246, n.3, 656 N.E.2d at 1231. Five other jurors stated "that
the defendant had to be insane to do what he did." Id. at 246, n.4, 656 N.E.2d at 1231.
See also Murphy, supra note 9, at 22 (revealing different results of individual voir dire
versus collective voir dire).

" See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 245, 656 N.E.2J at 1231 (discussing court's decision
that trial judge acted properly).
5'See id. at 249, 656 N.E.2d at 1232 (mandating individual voir dire for insanity
defense cases). Justice Wilkins, writing for the court, noted:
[I]n all future cases in which a defendant indicates that his of her lack of
criminal responsibility may be placed in issue and so requests, the judges
shall inquire individually of each potential juror, in some manner, whether
the juror has any opinion that would prevent him or her from returning a
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, if the Commonwealth fails in
its burden to prove the defendant criminally responsible. It will be in the
judge's discretion to ask more detailed questions concerning a juror's
view of the defense of insanity.
Id.
d2 See id. at 248, n.5, 656 N.E.2d at 1232 (discussing reasons for extension of individual voir dire); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 23 (noting reasons SJC changed its
mind finding individual voir dire necessary for insanity defense).
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lieve in the insanity defense. 53 In order to validate this argument, the
court examined outside empirical studies.5 4 The studies showed that
people viewed the insanity defense with great skepticism because it allowed defendants to escape without accepting responsibility for their
crimes. 55 Finally, the studies showed that the public viewed a psychiatrist's testimony at trial as a hoax.5
Six months after Seguin, the SJC decided Commonwealth v. Plunkett.57 In Plunkett, the Commonwealth charged the defendant with mur58

dering a man who allegedly made homosexual advances toward him.
The court, in reversing the defendant's conviction on other grounds, suggested that an individual voir dire may have been applicable given the
facts of this case.59 Specifically, the court reasoned that only eight out of
eighty jurors stepped forward to voice bias when questioned collectively,
despite the reality of the majority's bias. 6° The court did not, however,
declare that all cases involving homosexual issues require an individual
voir dire.6'

'3 See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 248, 656 N.E.2d at 1232 (discussing jurors answers to
judge's questions on insanity); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 23 (citing SJC's reasoning for requirement of individual voir dire in insanity cases).
54 See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 248, n.5, 656 N.E.2d at
1232 (discussing SJC's use of

empirical studies to aid in decision to mandated voir dire); see also Murphy, supra, note
9, at 23 (noting SJC examined empirical information in Seguin). Accordingly, the use of
empirical evidence suggests that the SJC will consider social science evidence in determining whether or not to mandate an individual voir dire in the future. Id.
"See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 248, n.5, 656 N.E.2d at 1232 (discussing results of empirical studies); see also Murphy, supra, note 9, at 23 (noting SJC's findings). The SJC
also stated that the general public felt that when the insanity defense is raised it is far
more successful than it really is. Id.
6See Seguin, 421 Mass. at 248, n.5, 656 N.E.2d at 1232 (noting additional findings of SJC); see also Murphy, supra, note 9, at 23 (discussing public's view of psychiatrists and their testimony at trial).
57 422 Mass. 634, 664 N.E.2d 833 (1996).
"See id. at 636-37, 664 N.E.2d at 835.
59See id. at 641,664 N.E.2d at 838 (discussing SJC's hint that individual voir dire
concerning homosexuality may be next step); see also Murphy, supra, note 9, at 23 (discussing Plunkett decision).
" See Plunkett, 421 Mass. at 641,664 N.E.2d at 838 (discussing jurors willingness
to come forward when asked collectively about feelings toward homosexuality).
6' See id. at 641, 664 N.E.2d at 838 (noting SJC's refusal to mandate individual
voir dire on homosexuality); see also Murphy, supra note 9, at 23 (noting SJC did not
add homosexuality to mandatory individual voir dire list).
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III. CONNECTICUT'S VOIR DIRE SYSTEM AND ANALYSIS OF
ITS EFFECTIVENESS USING SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH

A. Attorney Conducted Voir Dire v. Judge Conducted Voir Dire
The Connecticut voir dire system allows attorneys to the conduct
the voir dire rather than the judge.6 2 The civil and criminal judge's duties
usually consist of making an initial statement to the jury, explaining the
voir dire process and then excusing himself from the bench.6 3 The judge
generally remains away from the courtroom while the attorneys question
the jurors unless a problem arises which requires the judge's clarification
on an issue. 64 Thus, the attorneys are responsible not only for the questioning of each juror but also for determining a juror's bias. 65
Numerous scholars and legal commentators support the effectiveness of the attorney conducted voir dire in eliciting juror candor.66 Pro62

See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-240 (West 1999) (noting voir dire procedure
in civil cases). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
In any civil action tried before a jury, either party shall the right to examine, personally, or by his counsel each juror outside the presence of
other perspective jurors as to his qualifications to sit as a juror in the action. If the judge before whom the examination is held is of the opinion
from the examination that any juror would be unable to render a fair and
impartial verdict the juror shall be excused by the judge from any further
The
service upon the panel, or in the action, as the judge determines.
right of examination shall not be abridged by requiring questions to be put
to any juror in writing and submitted n advance of the commencement of
the action.
Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-82f (West 1999) (explaining voir dire procedure in criminal cases). The criminal statute reads exactly the same as the civil statute.
Id.
, See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-240 (West 1994) (noting no requirement that
judge remain on bench while attorneys are questioning jurors). See also CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 52-84f (West 1994) (noting same as civil statute).
" See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-240 (West 1994) (providing judge may leave
courtroom during voir dire to tend to other matters).
"See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-82f, 51-240 (West 1994) (discussing responsibilities of attorneys).
" See Jones, supra note 2, at 131 (testing juror candor when questioned by judge
and juror candor when questioned by attorney). In Jones' study, 116 jury eligible community residents were tested. Id. at 135. There were 42 males involved in the study and
69 females. Id. Jones paid each resident twenty dollars for their participation. Id. The
panel size ranged from 13 to 16 jurors. Id. Eight voir dires were conducted over four
days and alternated judge and attorney conducted voir dire each night. id. at 137. The
actors who played the role of the judge assumed the role of both a personable judge and a
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ponents note that attorneys are better suited to conduct the voir dire because their familiarity with the facts allows them to sense where the potential bias may arise and to probe that area more effectively than a
judge.67 The evidence also shows that jurors relate more easily to attorneys than judges because the potential juror feels closer on the social
scale to the attorneys. 68 Therefore, the potential juror will be more can69
did when responding to inquiries from an attorney rather than a judge.
The proponents of attorney conducted voir dire believe that attorneys
must conduct the voir dire in order to establish a rapport with the jury. 7°
formal judge. Id. at 136. The results from the study support the contention that attorneys are better at eliciting honest answers from jurors. Id. at 143. The subjects involved
changed their answers almost twice as much when questioned by a judge. Id. The judge
never elicited more candid answers than the attorneys in this study. Id. See also National Center for State Court's, Jury Trial Innovations, Ch III-1, 53-54 (1997) (comparing arguments for attorney conducted voir dire and arguments for judge conducted voir
dire); Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 252 (focusing on social science analysis to explain benefit of attorney rather than judge conducted voir dire).
67 See National, supra note 66, at 54 (stating lawyers familiarity with facts of case
make them more effective conductors of voir dire). Proponents of the lawyer conducted
voir dire argue that because a lawyer knows the facts and legal issues of the case better
than the judge attorneys are more effective questioners of the jurors. Suggs and Sales,
supra note 6, at 252. It is important to note that those in favor of attorney-conducted
voir dire also recognize that the trial judge should not have as much knowledge about the
case as the attorney and therefore the attorney is a much better solicitor of the truth. Id.
Judges have been accused over the years of not asking enough questions to elicit juror's
attitudes because they are trying to keep the system moving quickly. Id.
" See National, supra note 66, at 54 (noting jurors less intimidated by attorneys
and thus more honest). Researchers found that "since veniremen look upon the judge as
and important authority figure, the veniremen are reluctant to displease him and therefore
tend to respond to his questions with less candor than if the questions are posed by counsel." Neal Bush, The Casefor Expansive Voir Dire,2 LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY REVIEW 9,
17 (1976). The difference in status of the judge versus the attorney is also evidenced by
the judge's location in the courtroom. Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 253. He is
placed high above everyone in the courtroom and is spoken to by all who enter the court
as "your honor." Id. at 253. Researchers also found that too great a status differential
between those involved will reduce the possibility of a candid dialogue. Id. at 254. One
study of 116 community residents found that the jurors were more candid with attorneys
rather than judges. Jones, supra note 2, at 143. The Jones study conducted indicates that
those tested changed their answers almost twice as much when they were questioned by
a judge than when questioned by an attorney. Id. When questioned by a judge, the participants felt pressured to conform their ideas to the judge's belief. Id. at 144. When
questioned by the attorneys to whom they felt closer on a social scale, the jurors felt less
pressure to conform their answers to what they thought the attorneys wanted to hear. Id.
s9 See Bush, supra note 68, at 9 (noting difference in social status between judge
and attorney). See also Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 254 (noting judge's status
emphasized by location in courtroom and its effect on juror's response).
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The attorney-conducted voir dire also allows the litigants in the case to
feel as though they are directly participating in the jury selection process
via their attorney.7 '
Despite the support for the attorney conducted voir dire, states
such as Massachusetts continue to insist on the judge conducted voir
dire. 72 Proponents of the judge conducted voir dire argue that the attorney conducted voir dire takes too long. 73 Further, proponents assert that
attorneys, if given the authority to conduct the voir dire, will use the process for improper purposes such as the pre-trying of their case. 74 Despite
such arguments, Massachusetts should allow attorneys to question potential jurors because of the social science data showing jurors feel more
comfortable and honest when questioned by attorneys.75

70 See Bush, supra note 68, at 15-16 (noting establishing rapport as reason in favor
of attorney conducted voir dire). Other researchers have, however, noted that, although a
minimum level of rapport is necessary to allow the jurors to feel comfortable there may
come a time when rapport crosses the line and becomes ingratiating. Suggs and Sales,
supra note 6, at 250. Ingratiation can occur through what has been described as the
"grandstand play" which involves an attorney telling the jurors that he has the utmost
faith in the system and therefore he will not question them. Id. Another instance in
which an attorney may attempt to ingratiate himself with the jurors is by extending a
tremendous amount of courtesy to the panel, including questions about the health of the
older panel members. id. Thus, Ingratiation is strongly discouraged and should be
viewed as unacceptable. Id.
71 See National, supra note 66, at 55 (noting when attorneys conduct voir dire par-

ties have more faith in justice system).
72
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 28 (West 1996) (allowing judge as conductor of voir dire).
7 See National, supra note 66, at 55 (acknowledging efficiency as benefit of judge
conducted voir dire). Time efficiency is the most frequently mentioned justification for
maintaining the judge conducted voir dire. Bush, supra note 68, at 17. Minimization of
congestion is a legitimate reason to have a judge conducted voir dire, but this goal must
be balanced against the need to have the most effective jury selection process. Id. "If a
hasty judge-interrogated voir dire is permitted to predetermine the outcome of the trial,
the slight time saving that might result would not justify the result of a potentially biased
jury." Id. at 18. See also Jones, supra note 2, at 132 (noting proponents of judge conducted voir dire claim time and money savings).
74
See National, supra note 66, at 54 (proposing attorneys may use voir dire as part
of adversarial process to try their case). The National Center for State Courts recommends that judges set limits during the pre-trial conference on what attorneys may disclose to the jury in order to avoid this problem. Id.
75

dire).

See supra notes 66-71 (emphasizing effectiveness of attorney conducted voir
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B. Group Questioning v. Individual Questioning
Connecticut takes a different approach than Massachusetts by allowing attorneys to pose questions to each potential juror outside the
presence of the other jurors.76 The setting in which questions are posed
to potential jurors can often affect jurors' abilities to answer the questions
candidly." Researchers have accepted that individual questioning of
jurors promotes candor where as the collective questioning is ineffective
at obtaining juror candor. 78
The issue to determine, thus, is whether the collective group
questioning method in Massachusetts would yield the same results as
Connecticut's individual sequestered questioning method. 79 Social science research supports individually questioning jurors outside the presence of other jurors as the most effective method to obtain candid answers to all questions, especially the more difficult questions. 80 Researchers noted that "studies about conformity have demonstrated that to
avoid calling attention to themselves, panel members subjected to col-

76See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 51-240, §§ 54-82f (West 1999) (discussing individual, sequestered voir dire). The statute provides, in pertinent part: "[E]ither party
shall have the right to examine, personally or by his counsel each juror outside the presence of other prospective jurors as to his disqualification to sit as a juror in the action."
Id.
, See Bush, supra note 68, at 20 (noting court is intimidating to potential jurors
and not conducive to jurors speaking out). Individual juror questioning can make them
feel more comfortable. Id.
78 See id.(recognizing individual voir dire is most effective).

" See id. at 11 (reasoning that different methods yield different results).
goSee id. (discussing ineffectiveness of collective questioning). Bush gives various reasons for his support of the individual sequestered questioning of the potential
jurors. Id. Bush states that one of the basic assumptions of the voir dire process is that
jurors do not speak. Id. The conductor of the voir dire usually asks the potential jurors a
number of close-ended questions which the jurors give limited response to and the conductor continues questioning without determining whether one of the jurors may be
hesitant to answer any of the questions differently than the jurors. Bush, supra note 68,
at 11. One reason jurors do not speak out is that they are surrounded by a group of
strangers. Id. Secondly, many jurors do not have a job or other type of activity that
allows them to speak out in public, so they are less likely to speak out in a courtroom.
Id. Jurors only feel comfortable speaking out in this context when one of two of the
other members have already raised their hands. Id. at 12.
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lective questioning do not willingly volunteer information about themselves or reveal opinions that deviate from the other panel members." 8'
In the group questioning method, the entire group of prospective
jurors is asked a question such as "would any of you be unable to be fair
and impartial toward the defendant because of the media coverage which
surrounded this case? If no one from the group responds to this question,
the interviewer moves on to other areas. 8 2 Based on evidence showing
that people need to conform, the group setting is an inappropriate atmosphere for eliciting honest responses to questions. 8 3 This method of questioning is completely ineffective because it places jurors in an awkward,
and at times, embarrassing position. 84
a'See National, supra note 66, at 68 (noting results of human nature in group atmosphere). Researchers have noted that when people are called for jury service, they
experience an increased anxiety level. Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 259.
A variety of investigators find that anxious individuals have an increased
need for affiliation while they are awaiting a threatening event. Many
perspective jurors perceive interrogation in a public forum to determine
their suitability as jurors to be such a threatening event. In addition, conformity increases as the need for affiliation increases. Thus even before
the voir dire begins, there are socio-psychological factors at work which
encourage group cohesiveness and conformity of response, thereby militating against honest self-disclosure.
Id. at 259-60. See also Michael T. Nietzel, Ronald C. Dillehay, & Melissa J. Himeleing,
Effects of Voir Dire Variationsin Capital Trials: A Replicationand Extension, 5 No.4
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES AND THE LAW

467, 476 (1987) (studying effects of setting on

juror candor). One study examined a sample of 18 capital cases and defense attorneys'
success at obtaining candid answers in both the group setting and the individual setting.
Id. The results showed that a defense motion for cause produced more sustained challenges for cause under sequestered, individual voir dire rather than the group voir dire.
Id. These results reveal that the individual voir dire is more effective in producing information relative to juror bias. Id.
82See Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 260 (noting this is type of questioning
utilized by those states that use group mode of questioning). See also Bush, supra note
68, at 22-23 (stating it is essential to ask jurors open-ended questions requiring more
than yes or no answer). Judges tend to favor asking close-ended questions. Id.
83See Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 260 (discussing ineffective nature of group
questioning).
Even when relatively mundane questions are addressed to the prospective
jurors as a group, researchers have observed that they squirm in their seats
and look around to see if anyone else is going to volunteer information; if
they discover that no other hands are raised, they settle back in their
chairs and refuse to respond.
Id.
84
See Bush, supra note 68, at 19 (noting individual private voir dire is appropriate
if juror might give an embarrassing answer). See also Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at
260 (noting when jurors are asked very simple questions, they get nervous and want to
conform).
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In states that allow group questioning for general topics and individual questioning within smaller groups, juror candor improves but it is
still ineffective. 85
It was found that when an individual was called upon to
state his opinions in public after hearing the opinions
stated by the majority of the group over one-fourth of the
minority of individuals covertly changed their private
opinions and stated their public opinions so that they
matched those of the majority. When an individual was
not required to state an opinion in front of the group, the
degree of conformity was markedly lower.86
Research reveals that the most effective method for obtaining a candid
response from a juror is through individual questioning outside the pres87
ence of the other jurors. Individual voir dire is most effective because
it usually takes place in a less formal setting and the conductor uses a
less formal tone. 8 Furthermore, it is also more effective than other
methods because it removes people from big groups and makes it less
likely for them to feel self conscious. 89 Opponents of the individual voir
dire often cite time conservation as their main argument against this
more thorough process. 90 While time is an important consideration for

85 See Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 260 (noting smaller size fails to alleviate
need to conform). The conformity studies show that when individuals are required to
state their opinions in front of members of a group, "even under such non-threatening
conditions as requesting each individual to judge a line length" they still feel the need to
conform. Id. at 260. Furthermore, studies have shown that a juror is less likely to
change his opinion when questioned outside the presence of other potential jurors. Id. at
260.
" Suggs and Sales, supra note 6, at 260.
17 See id. at 261 (noting individual voir dire is best system). According to
the article, "if the goal of the voir dire is honest self-disclosure, the most effective ways to facilitate the achievement of that goal is to interview prospective jurors out of the presence
of their fellows, thus eliminating the conformity-generating aspects of the group voir
dire." Id.
8 See National, supra note 66, at 69 (noting individual voir dire as best method for
juror candor); see also Bush, supra note 10, at 20 (noting courtroom and its proceeding
not conducive to obtaining juror candor).
89See National, supra note 66, at 69 (noting individual voir dire prevents fear of
humiliation).
90See id. at 69 (noting judicial economy is central argument against individual
voir dire).
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the courts, the right to an impartial jury should be weighted as significantly more important than mere time conservation. 91

IV. CONCLUSION
The selection of an impartial jury is an essential element of a fair
trial, and yet Massachusetts continues to employ a process that is ineffective at obtaining an impartial jury. Massachusetts should adopt Connecticut's voir dire system that allows attorneys to individually question
jurors because it is more effective at obtaining juror candor. The effectiveness of the attorney conducted voir dire is evidenced by the abundance of social science research. The research details that potential jurors relate better to attorneys, attorneys are better able to establish a rapport with the jurors, and attorneys are more familiar with the facts of the
case. The effectiveness of the individual voir dire is also evidenced by
the abundance of social science research. The research details that the
individual voir dire is the most effective setting to obtain honest answers
from jurors. The individual voir dire prevents feelings of embarrassment
and prevents the need to conform. Further, evidence in support of the
individual voir dire can be derived from the findings of the SJC consistently recognizing the inadequacy of the group questioning method.
Clearly, Connecticut's system is more conducive to juror honesty and,
thus, should be implemented in Massachusetts.

DeboraA. Cancado

"' See supra notes 78-89 (discussing reasons in favor of individual voir dire).

